Fiscal surveillance was developed as a supranational regulatory process to counteract shorttermism and deficit biases in government decision-making. With effective monetary policy to stabilize the economy, restraint on the fiscal discretion of national governments was seen as the key to macroeconomic stability. The financial crisis and its aftermath challenge this paradigm. Private debt caused the crisis and monetary policy is so weak that pro-cyclical fiscal retrenchment could worsen fiscal outturns. We argue, contrary to the 'disciplinarian' interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact, that the regulatory process of fiscal surveillance is strongly affected by the potential perversities of fiscal restraint and is therefore resistant to the prescription of austerity. This claim is developed by tracing the technical difficulties encountered by fiscal surveillance since the financial crisis. The crisis has so destabilized expectations of the performance of the economy and the proper scope of government that the statistical and economic norms of surveillance have been undermined. We conclude that the problem with fiscal surveillance is not that the EU inflicts undue fiscal discipline on member states, but rather that the EU institutions are unable to protect member states against bond market panic, and therefore cannot coordinate stabilizing fiscal policies.
1
Searching under the lamp-post: the evolution of fiscal surveillance
Regulating budgets in hard times
Since the earliest days of monetary union, the Commission and the Council have looked for the key to macroeconomic stability under the lamp-post of fiscal surveillance. The initial Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was designed on the assumption that monetary union changed government incentives in incurring debt and running deficits. The prescription of discipline and control fitted well with the fashion of the time for a 'hands-tying' approach: fiscal authorities were meant to stay out of macroeconomic stabilization and let independent central banks take care of it (Forder 2001; Schelkle and Hassel 2012) .
The original disciplinarian SGP could not be implemented and was reformed in 2005. The orientation of the process shifted from sanctioning excessive deficits to ensuring the long-term sustainability of public finances. Schelkle (2009) argued that the system became more regulatory, with an emphasis on establishing common budgetary standards and procedures among national bureaucracies. Rather than operating as an external constraint on national governments as the disciplinarian approach implies, the regulatory interpretation sees commitment to fiscal rules and acceptance of external monitoring as part of the structure of checks and balances that can be found in any sovereign state. As a 'fourth branch of government', regulators exercise authority by consent, and rely on an expert consensus within the member states (Majone 1993) .
Both the disciplinarian and the regulatory thrust of fiscal surveillance shared the assumption that governments were the central cause of macroeconomic instability. But the crisis has made it evident that the fiscal surveillance lamppost does not illuminate all the necessary conditions for macroeconomic stability in the Euro area. The SGP did not detect the origins of the crisis: in all cases but Greece, it was private debt that fed the imbalances, not profligate fiscal policy. Indeed, Commission officials had noticed this in a report in 2006, before the crisis broke, and drew attention to current account imbalances arising from asset price bubbles and private credit expansion (CEC 2006) .
While the lamp-post was directed to the supposed risk of moral hazard among governments, the moral hazard of banks had proved to be a much greater problem. Nor would adherence to the prescription of fiscal rectitude provide a way out for the euro area countries: monetary policy remains strikingly ineffective at stabilizing, let alone stimulating, the economy, and macroeconomic stability is therefore underprovided. In paying heightened attention to fiscal indicators following a banking crisis, the EU resembles the drunk who looks for his lost keys under the lamp-post, not because he can be sure that they are there but because 'that's where the light is'.
We argue in this paper that the financial crisis has profoundly unsettled the process of fiscal surveillance. The SGP has proved unenforceable in the face of disagreement and genuine uncertainty about the best settings for fiscal policy.
Governments may indeed have short-termist reasons to run deficits, but they also have every reason vigorously to resist policies that they fear will create or worsen recessions. As we show below, they have particularly strong reasons when monetary policy is ineffective, or when the emphasis on fiscal 'soundness' leads to maintaining zombie banks. To continue to search under the fiscal lamp-post in these conditions strains the regulatory capacities of the Commission.
This argument runs directly against the disciplinarian interpretation of the Pact. On this interpretation, the original Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) suffered from a problem of 'sinners voting on sinners'. Member states in the Council were reluctant to impose discipline upon eachother. But, since the financial crisis, member states can be expected to be more inclined to penalize delinquents. Countries which see themselves as likely creditors in bailout arrangements clearly have incentives to limit their exposures. Even the weaker states may look more critically at eachother, given the evidence of how contagion can spread in European bond markets. On this account, the Pact has become more enforceable because member states' incentives have changed (Yiangou et al 2013: 233) .
This analysis invites the criticism that the euro area is gripped by an 'austerity delusion' (Blyth 2013 ). Blyth's own account is ideational rather than institutional: he pays no attention to the fiscal surveillance process and identifies Germany as the leading actor in the austerity drama, with the ECB as the sorcerer's apprentice. Others hold the Commission at least partly responsible: Krugman (2013) writes of a 'Rehn of terror', perversely flattering the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and the Euro for his role in the excessive enforcement of budgetary retrenchment. Taken at face value, without regard for the discretion which the Commission can exercise, the reforms to fiscal surveillance adopted since the financial crisis have tightened the fiscal constraints on member states (Barnes et al 2012) .
Our regulatory interpretation emphasizes that it is technical expertise that gives the Commission the authority to make national democracies conform to norms of 'good governance'. If the Commission cannot confidently maintain the technical soundness of the SGP, its role must be marginalized. We show below that the financial crisis has so destabilized expectations of the performance of the economy and the proper scope of government that the statistical and economic norms of surveillance have been undermined. We also show that it is to the credit of the Commission at the operational level that it has understood this and refrains from pressing for fiscal austerity in its assessments. Yet publicly the Commission must also play to the gallery of major guarantor countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, which require tough talk from Brussels for domestic consumption.
Our discussion falls into four sections. In the next section, we provide a brief account of the reforms to fiscal governance that have taken place and show that, while the new rules under the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact delegate more authority to the Commission, this does not mean that the Commission necessarily advocates austere policies. In practice, austerity has been imposed by the Troika of the IMF, the ECB and the Commission in the course of arranging financial support for countries requiring bailout programs; program countries are exempt from the normal fiscal surveillance process. Section 3 turns to the statistical process of accounting for the crisis, with a particular focus on the impact of financial sector instability. Eurostat strives to apply technical standards consistently, but we show that these standards have differential effects on strong and weak economies. Furthermore, our research identifies some deviations from consistent practice in accounting for bank recapitalizations. In section 4, we examine how the changed economic environment poses a challenge to the process of fiscal surveillance and to the Commission as the main stakeholder of the process.
We show how technical and political disagreements have emerged around the issue of cyclical adjustment. Section explores the interaction between fiscal rules and rescue programs. Given Germany's reluctance to create new supranational institutions, it is ironic that the fiscal rules militated against the use of bilateral lending programs and contributed to the creation of a new common institution. The wider point is that the indicators are manipulated by all parties, not just delinquent member states.
We conclude by summarizing how these findings fit into our interpretation of the contested politics of regulating budgets (Mabbett and Schelkle 2009 ). We agree with critics of austerity like Blyth and Krugman that the fiscal surveillance lamp-post shines on the wrong part of the pavement. But far from being a encompassing delusion or obsession, we find that the Commission is navigating a fine line being satisfying the political pressures facing national governments on the one hand, and avoiding causing economic damage on the other. Moreover, fiscal surveillance has become marginalized as a policy process. Meanwhile, Euro area member states are left exposed to the vagaries of the bond markets, with the Troika, as the conduit of procyclical market pressures, imposing austerity.
Searching under the lamp-post in the financial crisis

The evolution of fiscal surveillance
When the financial crisis broke, it seemed at first that the fiscal surveillance process would be allowed to generate assessments that were tolerant and forgiving of the straits in which member states found themselves. The immediate effect of the financial crisis was to create a short-lived Keynesian turn in fiscal policy in Europe. Member states undertook stimulus programs which were endorsed and given a European label in the form of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). These programs, combined with sharp falls in GDP, took almost all member states across the threshold for deficits. The members states in the Council decided to start Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDPs) against each one of them, even though an escape clause in the Pact could have been invoked that said that, in the case of a deep recession, an EDP could be suspended. The opening of an EDP forces a government to inform its peers in the Council in detail about its budgetary plans. In other words, given the number of 'delinquents', the EDP process created a venue for policy coordination. This phase, whereby counter-cyclical policy was endorsed in the surveillance process, was brought to an end by the emerging sovereign debt crisis in Greece, and its contagious effects. The no-bailout clause could not be exercised because the relevant decision-makers feared the possible consequence of yet another 'Lehman moment'. The ECB was in effect drawn into monetary financing of government deficits, through its operations in bond markets. These developments created pressure for a revitalization of fiscal surveillance. Both Germany, as the principal guarantor of bailout funds, and the ECB, with a hawkish reputation to defend, pressed for stronger arrangements for fiscal control.
Importantly, stronger controls did not have to come through the established surveillance process. Instead, there were opportunities to impose austerity in the loan agreements made with member states that had to call on the IMF and the EU for assistance. Loan agreements were not bound by the norms of symmetry and common agreement that were foundational for the fiscal surveillance process. Under IMF rules, the key criterion for a loan agreement was that the borrowing country should adopt a program that would enable it to repay. This program could prescribe a country-specific adjustment path and could impose requirements which lenders themselves did not comply with.
There can be no question about the effectiveness of these programs in promoting austerity. Countries operating under loan agreements, generically termed Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes (MAPs), have been required to cut expenditure, take steps to raise revenue, and reduce debt through privatization. Austerity programs were also adopted by Ireland (before being pushed into accepting a MAP) and by Spain out of the desire to avoid a loan and the MAP that came with it. This meant that they responded to bond market pressures, which were strongly pro-cyclical. In other words, countries whose ability to service their debt was called into question by bond investors were all forced into austerity, but not by the fiscal surveillance process. 
Reforms to fiscal surveillance
Germany's sudden disaffection with the rigor of enforcement of fiscal surveillance by the Commission and Council was reflected in the initiative to create an intergovernmental Fiscal Compact (Chang 2013: 264) . This intergovernmental treaty, outside the EU's legal framework, is modeled on legal changes, among them a 'debt brake ' (Schuldenbremse) Eurostat has obtained extended rights to visit member states and inspect primary source data; if fraud is detected, the government can be fined.
Furthermore, the assumptions underlying GDP forecasts must be verified and assessed by national fiscal councils, and agreed with the Commission. Table   1b gives an overview. that the Commission will be inclined to make hard-line recommendations for compliance with fiscal rules. As the following sections show, it is by no means clear that the Commission is inclined to stick to the letter of the fiscal rules, and it has discretion to make lenient evaluations and recommendations.
The 'Two Pack' of regulations codifies the ad hoc arrangements adopted in loan agreements. It thus continues the mirroring of intergovernmental measures in supranational legislation which we saw with the Fiscal Compact and the Six Pack. Loan agreements have been country-specific; the Two Pack establishes generic procedures. It confirms that countries in financial difficulties or receiving support from the ESM will be subject to inspection of their budget plans and regular mission visits to the country. It spells out the general parameters of loan conditions in MAPs, and provides that these replace regular fiscal surveillance processes as long as they are in force. Table   1c summarizes the provisions of the Two Pack. The measures secure the role of the Commission in preparing assessments and making recommendations. However, as the following sections show, it is far from clear that the Commission will always use these powers to recommend fiscal consolidation measures. Our interpretation is that the TwoPack confirms that the operation of fiscal surveillance for non-program countries is distinct from the imposition of austerity in program countries. In non-program countries, the emphasis is on avoiding pro-cyclical retrenchment, while the programs enforced by the Troika on countries requiring official lending yield to the pro-cyclical tendencies of bond markets.
Accounting for the financial crisis
The fiscal surveillance process starts with ascertaining the data on deficits and debt. It has become clear in the aftermath of the crisis that some of these rules are inconvenient and others are unsuited to current conditions. In this section, In making these judgments, statisticians turn to a second norm: reliance on market judgments. This norm reflects a widespread shift in accounting practice away from historic cost accounting towards 'marking to market', where the market is seen as providing objective valuations. For example, when a government purchases shares on an active market, 'any excess of the price paid by the government over the prevailing market price is recorded as a capital transfer' (Eurostat 2012b: 1) . Alternatively, the expected rate of return can be compared with 'a sufficient' rate of return -if the expected return on the now publicly owned assets is lower than the sufficient return for a commercial investor, the difference is deemed to be a capital transfer. The presence of private co-investors is taken to indicate an adequate return, 'since it is assumed that the private investors are seeking a return' (Eurostat 2012b: 2). This approach has some affinities with the methodology used by DG Competition to calculate the 'state aid' element in government intervention:
Statistical principles versus economic outcomes
specifically with the so-called 'private market investor principle' (Hancher et al 2012) . But it is applied there in a microeconomic setting where the intervention can be scrutinized in isolation.
Applying the method in an unstable macroeconomic situation introduces systematic biases towards deficit-increasing classifications in weak economies, however. Market valuations are affected by negative 'animal spirits', driving down expected rates of return, and high risk premia, driving up the rate of return that private co-investors would consider sufficient Table 5 ).
Such differential treatment can create the impression of political bias, in this case in favor of Germany. But statisticians adhere to norms and operate in an environment which apparently precludes direct political intervention. We suggest that the classification reflects the judgment of 'the markets' in an environment in which Germany's economic performance is much stronger than that of Ireland. The classification is not necessarily wrong in its implicit prediction about whether bailout expenditure will be recovered. But it works to the detriment of weaker economies and reinforces pro-cyclical market pressures.
A similar process, namely of letting market valuations rule a policy process, is at work in determining how entities brought into public ownership should be 11; Eurostat 2010: 6-7). Eurostat argued that the magnitude of their losses meant that they should be accounted for as non-market producers and hence as part of general government. Portugal also experienced a considerable rise in gross public debt because of the reclassification of public enterprises. The adverse economic environment made the statisticians decide that these enterprises will make losses for the foreseeable future and hence must be counted as debt-increasing parts of general government. While justifiable in each case on narrow statistical grounds, these decisions create the impression that the governments had been hiding debt figures before. However, all that happened was that their economies worsened.
Separating fiscal from monetary policy
Since the financial crisis, the norm that the definition of general government should be as comprehensive as possible has repeatedly raised issues over the classification of financial intermediaries inside or outside it. An entity that is classified as a financial intermediary cannot be part of general government:
the definitions are mutually exclusive. The general principles are that the classification should depend on the extent of autonomy of decision and the assignment of risk. Financial intermediaries 'place themselves at risk by acquiring financial assets and incurring liabilities on their own account.' (Eurostat 2013: 31) . The financial crisis revealed that banks generally do not place themselves at risk: rather, they place public finances at risk.
Hence, it is necessary to decide when the risk to public finances is remote enough to maintain the distinct status of a financial intermediary, and when the risk has crystallized sufficiently to bring the liabilities onto the government account with the bank losing its status as a financial institution. If it loses this status, it has no longer access to liquidity provided by the ECB.
Eurostat has taken the view that 'defeasance structures' or 'bad banks' are part of general government. It issued guidance in 2009 to the effect that 'Government-owned special purpose entities, which have as their purpose to conduct specific government policies (for example with regard to defeasance or recapitalisation) with no autonomy of decision, are to be classified in the general government sector' (Eurostat 2009: 5) . This meant that their debt would become part of general government debt, and any ongoing deficits of those entities would add to the deficit.
An implication of this decision is that governments which lack fiscal room for manoeuvre must avoid creating defeasance structures, and instead leave impaired assets inside the originating banks to be gradually worked out. But this is widely thought to be a counterproductive strategy that leads to a 'Japan scenario': it hides problems and postpones a return to normal operations in the banking system. One 'solution' is to have bad banks in majority private
ownership. Yet, statisticians pursue a norm of 'substance over form' in deciding how to classify entities, and private ownership is not normally sufficient, although it is necessary, for an entity to be excluded from the public sector and hence from general government (Eurostat 2013: 12 It might be imagined that an entity which is, for example, granted a banking licence by the national regulator and meets the financial soundness requirements laid down by the central bank should selfevidently be a market entity and not part of general government. But this was not how the statisticians saw it. In April 2012, Eurostat produced an analysis in which it found that the debt of some MFIs was effectively general government debt: in other words, the government was bearing the risks.
However, it could not reclassify these entities as part of general government because the ECB insisted that they were MFIs (Eurostat 2012c: 
Fiscal surveillance in a depression
In this section, we show how the Commission navigates between the political pressures from major guarantor countries to ensure fiscal discipline and an economic situation where there is a heightened risk that collective fiscal restraint may trigger a downward spiral of the Euro area economy. The technical method for avoiding pro-cyclical austerity is cyclical adjustment.
While the original Pact specified that '3% is 3%', the Commission and the Rehn's argument was drawn straight from the theory of 'growth friendly fiscal consolidation' or 'Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction' (Giavazzi and Pagano 1996; cf Blyth 2013: 57-58, 131-2) . He might have believed this theory, but it is also evident that he simply insisted on the inadmissibility of the discussion of fiscal multipliers, as this would undermine the political case for fiscal restraint and control. However, his officials appear to have paid more attention to their peers among economists, or perhaps they were more concerned with due diligence in their empirical work. They have to assess member states' forecasts of GDP and evaluate their consistency with fiscal plans. It cannot be ruled out that fiscal policy affects GDP; if this is ignored, then forecasts will be incorrect.
The 'Codes of Conduct' -the guides to preparing surveillance reports--prepared by Rehn's officials suggest that they are not convinced that fiscal multiplier effects can be discounted. The guide for all member states (in and out of the euro area) simply states that assumptions on real GDP growth should be underpinned by an indication of the expected demand contributions to growth (CEC 2012: 14) . The code for euro area states, revised in 2013, is more explicit. It asks reporting countries to specify the assumptions on which their GDP estimates are based, including 'the estimated impact on economic growth of the aggregated budgetary measures envisaged in the DBP' (draft budget plan) (CEC 2013: 3) . This estimate is also itemised in the report's first table on macroeconomic prospects. In practice, the surveillance process thus acknowledges that the fiscal multiplier can be uncomfortably effective in some member state economies.
The possible endogeneity of GDP with respect to fiscal policy provides a good reason for officials to keep their eyes firmly on the medium term, as allowed by the Six Pack reform. It also suggests that policy recommendations to adopt structural reforms to promote growth are less likely to have perverse effects than recommendations to raise taxes or cut expenditure. And this is exactly what we find in the Commission's assessments. Member states are repeatedly urged to adopt 'growth friendly structural measures' drawn from a limited and familiar menu: pension reform, improvements to public administration, changes to wage-setting institutions, and measures to liberalize the services sector and network industries.
The Commission itself is under surveillance for the accuracy of its assessments, and its approach to structural adjustment has been subject to some criticism. can easily highlight particular difficulties of interpretation created by the financial crisis. But more strikingly and profoundly, we also find that policies adopted to manage the crisis -specifically, the creation of European bailout funds -affect the interpretation of fiscal indicators, as do the moves taken towards a banking union.
5 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2012/pdf/ecp_455_en.pdf in Graph 1. 6 This is not to say that we consider the labour market reforms endorsed by the EU to be particularly helpful; they have arguably contributed to the dualisation of labour markets and the creation of poverty traps for working adults that even the OECD now admits.
The SGP could be criticized from its inception for referring to the structural balance including interest payments, rather than the primary balance, since fiscal authorities cannot control the interest they have to pay (Blanchard 1990 ). The cyclically-adjusted primary balance would be a better indicator of their discretionary fiscal position. Most of the countries attacked in the bond markets now have primary surpluses, but their interest burdens produce substantial overall deficits. These were magnified in the first rescue programs by the insistence of the lenders on setting a 'prohibitive price tag' so that official lending would only be used as a last resort (Schäuble, quoted in Gocaj and Meunier 2013: 242) . As it became clear that this policy was counterproductive, interest burdens have been reduced. Greece, in particular, has benefitted from several revisions to the terms of its loans. Each reduction in the interest rate charged by the lenders brings compliance with the deficit target closer, even though it has nothing to do with the borrower's behavior.
The gross debt indicator is also problematic. As discussed in the section on Eurostat's fiscal accounting, when distressed financial institutions are rescued by governments, they may be reclassified as part of 'general government'.
This will often produce a sharp one-off increase in the level of government debt, but without a corresponding deficit. Debt and deficits are related:
normally, the deficit is equal to the increase in the debt. The deficit is a flow that adds to the debt stock. If the arithmetic does not add up, a 'stock-flow adjustment' (SFA) has to be made to reconcile debt and deficit outturns. The effect is that there has been a veritable explosion of SFAs since the financial crisis. Before the crisis, these SFAs were taken as indicators of 'fiscal gimmickry;, ie governments gaming the deficit criterion under the SGP.
Moreover, financial transactions that see the government taking over financial institutions raise gross debt more than net debt since the banking assets acquired are not counted against the cost to the government. For example, the gross general government debt of the Netherlands stood at 66.2% of GDP in 2011, but the net debt at just 31.8% (IMF 2012: 18) . The conclusion the IMF draws is that both gross and net debt should be monitored (IMF 2012: 23) , and it has the discretionary power to do this. But the EU is stuck with its gross measure.
This had striking consequences when a bailout mechanism came to be designed. One possibility for lending to Greece was to avoid the use of an EU mechanism, with individual member states lending to Greece bilaterally. But this was unattractive to the lenders, because the borrowing they undertook to on-lend to Greece would raise their gross debt, and the corresponding asset (the Greek loan) could not be set against this. In the jargon of the time, bilateral loans were 'too heavy in terms of balance sheets' (Renaud-Basso, quoted in Gocaj and Meunier 2013: 242) . At the same time Germany, in particular, did not want to create a fund under EU authority (Barber 2010) .
The solution was to establish the EFSF as a special purpose vehicle of which the guarantors were partners. Yet, it turned out not to be a solution at all in accounting terms. Eurostat soon decided that the guarantees provided by non-program countries should count as part of their gross debt (Eurostat 2012d: 1) . Balance sheets duly swelled.
The creation of the ESM as a permanent EU institution with its own legal personality addressed the balance sheet problem for the guarantors. Because the ESM has its own legal personality and a higher buffer of loss-absorbing capital, the credit it gives to program countries does not count as debt of non-program countries guaranteeing ESM bond issues (Eurostat 2012d: 2-3) . We can see in this instance how an institutional arrangement was adopted to produce a more favorable accounting outcome for the guarantors, without any change in the substance of their contingent liability.
Furthermore, the Council's agreement that the ESM could intervene in primary bond markets, ie buy bond issues from governments directly financial sector instability has threatened fiscal sustainability.
The ECB's insistence on conditionality is puzzling, given its institutional interest in financial stability for which progress on bank recapitalization is ssential. One explanation for the apparent inconsistency of the ECB's position is that central bankers are inclined to see budget balances as a matter of political willpower while they are rather fatalistic about financial market failure. Another explanation is that the ECB had failed in its own attempt to enforce conditionality on one of the countries (Italy) benefitting from its intervention in the market for their bonds. Pact. There is no way to exclude these interventions from the statistical measures of debt and deficits, but they can be 'taken into account as a relevant factor' in the Commission's assessment of compliance. The aim of the letter was establish, or at least to assert, 'that the EU fiscal rules provide no disincentive' to publicly financed bank recapitalizations (Rehn 2013b) . We can see here that the Commissioner for the Euro is capable of sensible discretion in situations where there are no established procedures on which some member states can insist.
9 The ECB was bruised by its attempt to get assurance from then Prime Minister Berlusconi to cut expenditure and engage in structural reforms in return for the ECB's buying of Italian government bonds in secondary markets. On August 5 th 2011, ECB President Trichet and the Italian Central Bank Governor Draghi wrote a letter (in English) with specific instructions and deadlines to the Prime Minister. Berlusconi complied, but as soon as Italian bond yields fell, he stopped pursuing the reform agenda. The ECB retaliated by reducing its bond purchases which drove yields up again, and under intense pressure from other members, the Commission and the IMF, Berlusconi had to resign in November 2011 (Bastasin 2012: 336-339) .
Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the evolution of fiscal surveillance under the stress of a drawn-out financial crisis. It has been claimed that Europe suffers from an 'austerity delusion' (Blyth 2013) . Fundamentally, governments could not be accused of delinquency when the deterioration of fiscal positions was clearly the result of financial collapse.
If we track through the mountains of guidance and reports produced by the Commission, we find that fiscal surveillance casts a soft and wide light.
Commission officials can fairly claim to have recognized early that adherence to the fiscal rules was an insufficient basis for stability in the Euro area (CEC 2008) . The reforms in the Six Pack are often presented as a 'toughening' of the regime, but this has not been reflected in recommendations and decisions.
Instead, we find the deadlines for adjustment being pushed further into the distance with reference to 'relevant factors' and 'exceptional economic circumstances', while verdicts on current outturns continue to reflect fragile economic conditions. The strengthening of the 'preventative arm' of the Pact and the shifting of focus towards debt rather than deficits have served to The weakness of collective institutions to counter pro-cyclical bond market pressures remains the euro area's greatest failure.
